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[Crim. No. 10153. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v .. JOSEPH LYLE 
STONER, Defendant and Respondent. 
[1] Oriminal Law - Evidence Resulting From Evidence illegally 
Obtained: Oonfessions.-The confession of one accused of rob-
bery was not sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 
primary taint of an illegal search and seizure six days earlier 
in his hotel room, and must be excluded, under the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine, where there was no break in the 
chain between the two events, where for the three days between 
his arrest and his confession and arraignment the investigating 
officers used the items illegally seized to induce him to confess, 
where he was told that his room had been searched, that they 
had found incriminating evidence there, where during this 
period he talked with none of his relatives, and received no 
legal advice, and where the }'ecord did not show that prior 
to the confession he had been told of his right to remain silent. 
[2] ld. - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure - Evidence Not 
Within Rule-Identification.-The rights of the accused as to 
an independent courtroom identification by an eyewitness, fol-
lowing an identification by the same witness in a showup 
tainted by the product of an illegal search and seizure, are 
adequately protected when the witness takes the stand in open 
cpurt, for examination and cross-examination, even though it 
may be impossible for him to forget a significant perception 
and to prevent stored remembrances from subconsciously 
affecting hi$ later perceptions and decisions. 
[3] ld.-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure-Evidence Not 
Within Rule-Identi1ication.-The courtroom identification by 
an eyewitness of one accused of robbery, although partly 
dependent on a viewing at an earlier showup identification, in 
which the accused was made to wear horn-rimmed glasses and 
- a gray sweater taken from his room in an illegal search and 
seizure, was sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint, where the items illegal1y taken were not ad-
mitted into evidence, where the eyewitness, before the showup, 
had tentatively identified him from a photograph, Rnd at a 
hearing at the trial outside the presence of the jury stated that 
on the night of the crime the accused had stood close to him 
for five minutes and spoken several times, and that at this and 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 401). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 413.5(7), 467(3), 
467(4); [2-4] Criminal Law, § 413.5(6). 
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at other courtroom appearances he recognized him not only by 
sight but also from his soft and controlled voice. 
[4] Id.-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Seizure-Evidence Not 
Within Rule-IdentUication.-A showup identi1ication by an 
eyewitness of the accused would be admissible at the trial, 
despite the ,accused having been made to wear glasses and 
clothing obtained by an illegal search and seizure, if the pros~ 
cution were to prove that the identification had Dot been 
a1Iected thereby, for example, that the police had been told 
what the accused was wearing at the time of the crime and had 
followed the usual procedure of dressing up everyone at the 
showup in similar fashion, so that the accused, whether or not 
the items actually worn at the crime were available, would 
have been observed under virtually identical conditions. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. David W. Williams, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first de-
gree robbery reversed. 
Robert L. Kern, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Respondent. 
Thomas . C~· Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and David S. Sperber, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant's conviction of robbery in the 
first degree (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) was reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court on the ground that illegally 
seized evidence was admitted at his trial. (Stoner v. Oaltilor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483 [11L.Ed.2d 856, 84 8.0t. 889].) Uponre-
trial, defendant was again convicted of robbery in the first 
degree. He appeals from the judgment. 
At 8 p.m. on October 25, 1960, two men, one with a gun, 
entered the Budget Town Market in Monrovia and ordered 
David Greeley, a clerk at the checkout counter, to put the 
money from the cash register in a paper bag. They forced 
Greeley and another clerk to lie on the floor and then lef~. 
When the police arrived, Greeley told them that the man with 
the gun was wearing a gray sweater or jacket, gray pants, a 
gray shirt, a gray work hat, and horn-rimmed glasses, and was 
holding a gray .45 caliber automatic. 
The day after the robbery, a person who lived next door to 
() 
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the Budget Town Market found a checkbook in her yard, 
which she gave to the manager of the market, who in turn gave 
it to the police. Using the account number printed on the 
checks, the investigating officers obtained defendant's name 
and discovered that he had previously been convicted uf mur-
der and robbery. They showed a photograph of defendant to 
the clerks at the store and received a tentative identification 
of him as the man who had held the gun. The officers then 
went to the Mayfair Hotel where they believed defendant was 
staying. When the night clerk told them that defendant must 
be out because his room key was in his mailbox, the officers 
explained that they were trying to find defendant to arrest 
him on suspicion of robbery and asked permission to enter his 
room. The clerk took the officers to the room, unlocked the 
door and admitted them. The officers searched the room and 
found a pair of horn-rimmed glasses, several gray sweaters 
and jackets, and a gray .45 caliber automatic. 
On Saturday, October 29, defendant was arrested in Las 
Vegas and waived extradition. Although the investigating 
officers from Monrovia arrived in Las Vegas on Saturday 
night, they did not begin the return trip immediately because 
they wished to determine whether defendant's confederate was 
also in town. On Monday, October 31, the officers brought 
defendant to California. At his request, they stopped ir. 
Pomona so that he might talk to his parole officer. They then 
took him to the Temple City jail where he spent the night. 
On Tuesday morning defendant appeared in a showup and 
was told to put on the glasses, a sweater that had been taken 
from his room, and a hat. Greeley identified him at this time 
as the robber who had held the gun. Later that morning the 
investigating officers interrogated defendant and obtained an 
oral confession. Shortly after noon he was brought before a 
magistrate and arraigned. 
At defendant's first trial, the various items taken from his 
hotel room were introduced into evidence. The Supreme Court 
of the United States reversed the judgment of conviction, hold-
ing that these items were inadmissible on the ground that the 
police had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution when they searched defend-
ant's room. At defendant's second trial, the prosecution did 
not introduce any of the items that the police found in defend-
ant's hotel room. It relied primarily on defendant's oral con-
fession and Greeley's courtroom identification. Defendant took 
the stand and denied that he had committed the robbery. His 
I 
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former sister-in-law testified that defendant was at her house 
at 8 p.m. on the night of October 25, 1960. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
theconfcssion into evidence on the ground that it is a product 
of the illegal search and seizure and was therefore "a fruit 
of the poisonous tree." (Nardone v. United States, 308 'O'.S. 
338, 341 [84 L.Ed. 307, 60 8.Ct. 266] ; see Silverthor-ne Lum. 
ber 00. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-392 [64 L.Ed. 319, . 
40 8.Ct. 182, 24 A.L.R. 1426].) 
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 475 [9 L.Ed.2d 
441, 83 S.Ct. 407], the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered statements of a defendant made after the police had· 
unlawfully entered his home and illegally arrested him. It 
held that once the "verbal evidence . . . derives so immedi-
ately" from the misconduct, it must be excluded. This court 
has excluded extrajudicial statements of the victim of an 
illcgal search and seizure when it appeared that the statements 
were induced or impelled by the unlawful acts. (People v. 
Bilderback, 62 Ca1.2d 757, 768 [44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d 
921] ; see People v. Dixon, 46 Cal.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557] ; 
People v. Macias, 180 Cal.App.2d 193, 197-198 [4 Cal. Rptr. 
256].) In other jurisdictions extrajudicial statements are ex-
cluded when they are "the product" of (People v. Rodriguez, 
11 N.Y.2d 279, 286 [183 N.E.2d 65~, 653, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 
357]) or "obtained under the compulsion of the things seized" 
(Takahashi v. United States (9th Cir.) 143 F.2d 118, 122; see 
Oommonwealth v. Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, 707-708 [180 
N.E.2d 673, 676] ; People v. Bilderback, supra, at pp. 767-768; 
Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and 
Hope (1963) 42 Neb.L.Rev. 483, 548). 
Although there is conflicting testimony as to the details of 
what occurred between the time of defendant's arrest and his 
(>onfession, the uncontradicted facts (see People v. Trout, 54 
Ca1.2d 576, 583 [6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 
1418] ; People v. Berve, 51 Ca1.2d 286, 290 [332 P.2d 97]) 
compel exclusion of the confession as a fruit of the illegal 
search and seizure. Officer Collins, one of the investigating 
officers from Monrovia, testified that when he and his partner 
arrived in Las Vegas, they told defendant that he was sus-
pected of robbing the Budget Town Market and that his room 
at the Mayfair Hotel had been entered. The officer recalled 
that they told defendant their reasons for accusing him of the 
crime but he could not remember whether they had specifically 
informed defendant that a gun, eyeglasses, and clothing sim-
--.) 
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ilar to those seen by witnesses to the robbery had been taken 
from defendaut's room and that he hau. b('en tentatively 
identified as one of the robbers from his photograph. It WClS 
"possible" that they "might have" mentioned all these details 
to their prisoner. Either in Las Vegas or on the trip back to 
Monrovia, defendant told the officers that he wished to talk 
to his parole officer in Pomona. The officers called ahead to 
make an appointment. Defendant and his parole officer met 
in the Pomona jail on lIonday afternoon and discussed the 
possibility that defendant's parole would be revoked because 
a gun had been found in his room. Upon leaving the jail, the 
parole officer told the -investigating officers that defendant 
should have time to think since he was considering whether or 
not to make various admissions. 
Sometime on Monday, defendant requested permission to 
telephone his wife. According to defendant, the officers told 
him that he could not telephone anyone and especially not his 
wife. When he repeated his request, they told him that he 
could talk with his relatives after he confessed. Officer Collins 
testified that he told defendant that he preferred that defend-
ant not telephone his wife since she might alert his confederate 
in the crime and that at no time did he forbid defendant from 
making a telephone call although he certainly wished to keep 
him out of contact with the outside world so that defendant 
could think about making a confession. On Monday night, 
defendant's wife telephoned the police station. An officer told 
her that the Temple City jail had no facilities for visiting 
with the prisoners and that she could talk to her husband at 
the arraignment on the following day. 
On Tuesday morning, at an interrogation that followed the 
showup, defendant confessed to having participated in the 
robbery. He testified that before he confessed the officers 
showed him bis gun and glasses and told him tbat if he con-
fessed no charges would be pressed and he would be returned 
to prison only for violating the conditions of his parole. Officer 
Collins testified that no promises were made and that defend-
ant was shown the gun and glasses only after he admitted 
robbing the Budget Town Market. Defendant was told, how-
ever, that the police had taken a gun from his room. 
[1] It appears that from the time defendant was arrested 
in Las Vegas until he confessed, the investigating officers 
used the items they had illegally seized to induce him to con- _ 
fess. In Las Vegas, he was told that his room in the Mayfair 
Hotel had been searched. He learned from the investigating 
) 
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officers that incriminating evidence had been found there. 
By the time he had talked with his parole officer, he knew that 
the police had his gun. At the showup, if not before, he dis-
covered that his glasses and sweater had been seized. From 
the time that he was arrested in Las Vegas until the time he 
was arraigned, he talked with none of his relatives and re-
ceived no legal advice. l During this 72-hour period, defendant 
saw only police officers, his parole officer, and perhaps some 
other prisoners. Finally, the record does not show that defend-
ant was informed, at any time before he confessed, that he 
had a right to remain silent. 
Under these circumstances there was no break in the chain 
between the illegal search and seizure and defendant's confes-
sion. It was not" sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 
primary taint. " (Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at p. 486; 
see Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 90-91 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 
84 S.Ct .. 229].) 
Since the confession was inadmissible under the rule of 
Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. 471, 475, as fruit 
of the poisonous tree, we need not consider defendant's con-
tentions that it was involuntary and also inadmissible under 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 8.0t. 
1758], an~ People v. Dorado, 62 Oa1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 
398 P.2d 361]. Although the judgment must be reversed be-
cause of the error in admitting defendant's confession, he 
raises a subsidiary issue that may arise on retrial. 
Defendant contends that Greeley's courtroom identification 
must also be excluded as a fruit of the poisonous tree on the 
ground that Greeley was able to identify him at the showup 
only because he wore the illegally seized clothing and could 
not have identified him at the trial had he not identified him 
at the showup. 
Before Greeley identified defendant at the trial, the court 
conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury to deter-
mine whether Greeley's courtroom identification would be de-
pendent upon his identification at the showup. Greeley stated 
that on the night of the robbery defendant stood at the check-
out counter for approximately five minutes and spoke several 
times. When Greeley compared his perceptions from watch-
tOfficer Collins testified that in Las Vegaa defendant asked for an 
attorney. When the officer asked who defendant's attorney was and how 
he might be reached, defendant changed his mind and said that he wished 
to talk to his parole officer. Defendant testified that he could not remem-
her whether or not he asked for an attorney but that he was quite aure 
the officers never offered to call one for him. 
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ing and listening to defendant in this and other courtroom 
appearances with his recollections of the night of the robbery, 
he was sure defendant was one of the robbers. "I mean you 
don't forget a person you are facing right on, whether having 
glasses on or a hat, or whatever they do have on, and his 
demeanor. He is quiet. He doesn't seem excitable and he is 
the same way he talked through-all the time. I think I would 
recognize him right off any time." .Again, when asked what 
made his remembrance so clear, Greeley replied, "probably 
more his demeanor than anything because he is quite calm, and 
when I talked to him, as I say, I think I recognized his voice 
as the same soft and controlled voice." The trial court ruled 
that the witness' courtroom identification would be sufficiently 
independent of his showup identification to be admissible. 
Defendant contends that regardless of how honestly and 
strongly an eyewitness to a crime may believe that his court-
room identification is not affected by an earlier tainted showup 
identification, it should be held as a matter of law that once 
a witness has made a tainted identification of the accused, 
he must be disqualified from ever making a subsequent court-
room identification, for he cannot clear ,his mind of earlier 
impressions. No cases have carried the f~uit-of-the-poisonous­
tree doctrine this far. 2 
[2] The federal courts have held that an eyewitness who 
has made an identification of the accused while the latter was 
being unlawfully detained following a lawful arrest is not pre-
cluded from making a subsequent independent courtroom iden-
tification. (See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States (8th Cir.) 356 F. 
2In a recent federal ease, a majority of the eourt held that a eourtroom 
identifieation was tainted by a previous view of the defendant by the wit-
ness in an illegal showup and therefore should not have been allowed. 
(Wade v. United State8 (5th Cir.) 358 F.2d 557, eert. granted 385 
U.S. 811 [17 L.Ed.2d 53, 87 S.Ct. 81].) It did not hold, however, 
that a tainted identifieation foreeloses any later identification freed of 
the taint, but earefully eonsiderecl all the surrounding eircumstances and 
coneluded that in the partieular situation the eourtroom identification 
was irremediably tainted by the earlier illegal showup. In two other fed-
eral eases, dissenting judges arrived at the same eonelusion on the facts 
before them but stated that the pivotal problem is the actual effect of 
the tainted identifieation on the courtroom identification. (Gilbert v. 
United State8 (9th Cir.) 366 F.2d 923, 951, dissenting opinion of Brown-
ing, J.; United State8 ex reI. Stovall v. Denno (2d Cir.) 355 F.2d 731, 
742, dissenting opinion of Friendly, Waterman and Smith, JJ., cort. 
granted 384 U.S. 1000 [16 L.Ed.2d 1014, 86 S.Ct. 1983].) In Gilbert, 
Judge Browning based his dissent on the fact that the trial judge did 
not make the necessary factual determination. The majority rejected the 
idea that a witness eould ever be tainted. In Denno, the dissenting judges 
found prejudiee because the jury was told about the tainted identifieation. 
" 
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2d 685; Edwards v. United States (D.C. Cir.) 330 F.2d 849.) 
As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently 
noted: "The consequence of accepting appellant's contention 
in the present situation would be that ... [the witness] 
would be forever precluded from testifying against . . . [the 
defendant] in court, merely because he had complied with the 
request of the police that he come to police headquarters and 
had there identified ... [the defendant] as the robber. Such 
a result is unthinkable. . . . The rights of the accused in a 
case like the present are adequately protected when the com-
plaining witness takes the stand in open court, for examina-
tion and cross-examination." (Payne v. United States, 294 
F.2d 723, 727, cert. den. 368 U.S. 883 [7 L.Ed.2d 83, 82 S.Ct. 
131].) In Monroe v. United States (D.C. Cir.) 234 F.2d 49 
[98 App. D.C. 228], cert. den. 352 U.S. 873 [1 L.Ed.2d 76, 
77 S.Ct. 94], it was held that the recipient of a telephone call 
could testify as to what he had heard although in the interim 
he had listened to an inadmissible tape recording of the same 
conversation. In Warren v. Territory of Hawaii, 119 F.2d 
936, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit permitted 
witnesses to testify on the basis of independent recollections 
even though their testimony reiterated statements they had 
previously made to the police when confronted with evidence 
that the court assumed had been illegally seized. 
Thus, thc fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine has not been 
invoked when the alleged fruit is testimony of a witness to a 
crime whose identity was not learned through police mis-
conduct. (See Payne v. United States, supra, at p. 727.) 
Although it may be impossible for a person to forget a signifi-
cant perception and to prevent stored remembrances from 
subconsciously affecting his later perceptions and decisions 
(see Bartlett, Remembering (1961) pp. 186-214; Cameron, 
Remembering (1947) p. 78; 5 Freud, Collected Papers 
(Strachey ed., 1950) pp. 175-180), it does not follow that the 
testimony of a person in Greeley's position should be ex-
cluded. [3], [4] [See fn. 3.] Even if Greeley's courtroom 
identification was dependent in part on his viewing defendant 
in illegally obtained clothing at the showup, it was" 'suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " 
(Wong Sun v. United States, S1tpra, at p. 488, quoting 
J. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p. 221.)3 
3In considering the admissibility of Greeley's courtroom identification, 
wo have assumed that the trial court correctly excluded Greeley's showup 
identification on the ground that it was tainted by the use of defendant's 
illegally seized glasses and clothing. The showup identification would be 
Since other questions raised are not likely to arise on re-
trial, we need not consider them here. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., 
and Roth, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
